

Series II
Subjects Files,
1916-1973

Box 14, Folder 6

Correspondence,
Letters sent,
1952

0 1 6 6

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

June 10, 1952

Dear Mr. Kawakami:

I am writing to you to mention several things.

First, I hope that your affairs with Mr. Cassidy are coming out satisfactorily to yourself. For your information, I wrote to Mr. Cassidy that (a) you were not an ordinary translator, (b) that you had a very excellent knowledge of Japanese and knew very well what went on in the Japanese war on the Japanese side; (c) you had to now review the Japanese side of the Battle for Leyte Gulf which is now some 277 pages and (d) I relied on you to state what is correct in accordance with the Japanese data available. I said, among other things, that I thought you quite superior and that, if our Japanese write-up is correct, it will be in a large part due to you. I further said that you were extremely punctilious and accurate and surprisingly without bias.

Secondly, I want to tell you that I have not been satisfied with my write-up of the 15th as I do not feel that it did justice to the Japanese leaders. I am now in the process of rewriting the 15th and I will send it to you presently. I think that you will find that the new write-up is far more realistic. The reason for this difficulty is that I was away for about three weeks on government business and somehow lost the contact.

Thirdly, I would appreciate it if you can send me the original document of Shibata's Diary. I am interested in tracing the diagrams shown in the Diary concerning contacts on the 15th and placing it in the book. I also might find some little point which may be helpful in solving some of my quandaries.

I am delighted that Roger is back and I hope that he is in good health and that what he brought back is good. However, if there is anything new in it, which from your memo seems unlikely for the period 10th to 17th, I, of course, would be glad to get it.

With best regards to you, to Mrs. Tanaka and to Monsieur Pineau, I am,

Very sincerely yours,


R.W. BATES.

Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami,
Office of Naval Records and History,
Room 1534, MAIN NAVY,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

June 16, 1952

Dear Mr. Kawakami:

Thank you very much for the prompt action concerning the data submitted by Monsieur Pineau. I am reading it now and will comment presently. I will say this, however, that the date of the discussion between Kusaka and Toyoda was October 12th as written in the War College analysis.

Here is a quote from Admiral Takata's statement of October 10th, 1949:

"At about 0930 hours on the same day [Oct 10] the headquarters in Tokyo alerted the Base Air Force for the SHO Operations No. 2 and prepared to have the T Air Attack Force attack at the right moment. C-in-C Toyoda, who was then in Shinchiku, also alerted the Base Air Force for the 'Sho' Operations Nos 1 and 2, before he was informed of this issuance of the order from Tokyo. As it turned out, however, his issuance of the order was three hours after that from Tokyo. This conduct on the part of the headquarters in Hiyoshi gave such an impression to Admiral Toyoda that the headquarters in Hiyoshi would issue further orders making contact with the Imperial General Headquarters. He therefore expected the Headquarters in Hiyoshi to contact Imperial General Headquarters, and issue the orders for the Base Air Force to begin the SHO Operations. No such orders were issued even on the following day. He, therefore, suggested by telegram to the Headquarters in Hiyoshi that 'the orders to begin the operations be issued from Hiyoshi after a thorough discussion of the matter with the Navy Department of Imperial General Headquarters.'

"It was, therefore, understood that the orders issued by the Hiyoshi Headquarters to the Base Air Force regarding the commencement of the SHO Operations were issued with the full approval of Imperial General Headquarters. The Hiyoshi Headquarters which was in a position to readily contact Imperial General Headquarters constantly issued orders and disposed of necessary matters while C-in-C Toyoda was in Formosa."


0169

Further, I am sending you a partial rewrite of the 15th. I request that you replace the present pages with the new pages. All pages were not re-done so this is a replacement of pages rather than a rewrite.

Congratulations on the satisfactory agreement with Mr. Cassidy. I think that you got what you deserved and I am as gratified as you are.

With best wishes to everyone, I am,

Very sincerely yours,


R.W. BATES.

Encl: Corrected pages Orange Side BFLG
234-243, 247, 249, 254-256,
258-270, 272-277

Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami,
Office of Naval Records and History,
Room 1534, MAIN NAVY,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

June 17, 1952

Dear Mr. Kawakami:

You have brought up an extremely interesting question in your letter CHK No. 47. This is the question relating to the fact that in your mind the employment of the "Base Air Forces only" was a Navy deviation from the SHO plan.

The idea that you have advanced is not new to us. I saw it long ago and commented on it, but refrained from putting it in the book because I could not prove it with the data on hand. In order to enter this in the book it is necessary to know the following:


- This is
fair to clear
Central Army
Navy Air
Agreement* [
- (a) Do we know that this authority for Base Air Forces only was not included in the Imperial General Headquarters Basic Plan?
 - (b) Do we know that the Army SHO plan corresponding to the Combined Fleet's SHO plan did not provide for Army Air only?
 - (c) The evidence seems to be that the Army plan did make this provision for the Army Air Forces in the Philippines during these days launched strong attacks against TF-38, which attacks were not under Navy command, but instead were under Army command.

I think your point is excellent if true, and I would love to put it in the book, but we put in this book only documentary evidence. With this, I am sure, you heartily agree.

Can you document the above?

With best regards, I am,

Very sincerely yours,



R.W. BATES

Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami,
Office of Naval History & Records,
Room 1534, MAIN NAVY,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

0171

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

June 20, 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami

1. Enclosed herewith is one diagram of command for the Japanese side of the operation up to October 17th. If you see anything wrong with it, your comment to this effect will be appreciated.
2. Also enclosed herewith is the writeup for October 16th which I request you place in the draft of the book heretofore sent you. I hope that you will comment on it.
3. You will observe that on the 16th I found it necessary to consider that the October 15th contact reports concerning the five carriers northeast of Formosa and the three carriers in the same area had not been received by CinC, Combined Fleet or by Tokyo at the time they were made, but somehow had become lost in the communication chain until early morning of October 16th. If this is accepted as a fact then the Japanese dispatches of the 15th make good sense, in general, but if it is not accepted as a fact, then the writeup which I had on the 15th originally would have to obtain. This would not make good sense.
4. Commander Hartmann has left but not fully. He is at home continuing his paper hanging and plumbing activities at which he excels. So, should you produce some error or recommend some change in the air operations, he and I can talk it over providing I hear of it within the next few days.



R.W. BATES.

Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami,
Office of Naval Records and History,
Room 1534, MAIN NAVY,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

Encls: Command Diagram - Japanese Side
Pages 278-328 incl. BFLG

0172

July 3, 1952

Dear Mr. Kawakami:

Yesterday I received a letter from the Administrative Chief of the Navy Department, Admiral Hartman, saying that he could not find a vacancy within the office of the Chief of Naval Operations for more than one person in my Washington office. Since he had promised me that this would not occur, I am, needless to say, highly disturbed.

I have written to him that I will be in Washington on Tuesday, July 8th, to discuss this matter with him and, if the situation is no better, I will then call you into conference on that day and we will arrive at a decision.

Admiral Hartman says that we can have either you or Mrs. Tanaka as we see fit, but that there are no vacancies for both. I think the whole foul-up lies with Mr. Cassidy who, having been directed long ago by Admiral Hartman to make arrangements for you and Mrs. Tanaka completely forgot about it until about a month ago when I sent Captain Rochefort to interrogate him as to the situation. Then Mr. Cassidy admitted that he had taken no action.

Since that time Mrs. Rosenberg, Asst. Secretary for Defense in charge of man-power, has frozen all civilian civil service personnel in Washington with the net result that our section was limited to but one civil service employee.

Admiral Hartman is quite willing if you wish to remain to allow your new GS-12 rating. Its not the money - its the vacancy.

You asked me what I think of your criticisms. I assure you that I find them highly beneficial and have accepted most of them, but not all. I pulled Commander Hartman back from his new duty into conference and we have straightened out most of the data. You are quite a fellow!

0173

I am sending you an appraisal of the Japanese losses, which is the last data on the Japanese side. That will end the whole affair up to 0719 October 17th.

With best regards to you and Mrs. Tanaka and regrets that this unfortunate situation has arisen, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

R.W. BATES.

Enclosure: Discussion of plane losses Orange Side EPIG.

Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami,
Office of Naval Records and History,
Room 1534, MAIN NAVY,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

0174

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

July 9, 1952

Dear Mr. Kawakami:

I talked with the Commodore this morning and he was under the impression that you were translating 1YB Action Report (WDC 161641). If so it will not be necessary, for as you may remember I did that some time ago. In fact you translated the section on "Opinions" for me the last time I was down there.

He also asked about the translation of 221 AG at SHINCHIKU (?), from the papers brought back by Roger. He had gotten the impression that there was little of value in the report due to the fact that the Group's principal tasks were Combat Air Patrols. You are the best judge of the value, to us, of the report, I merely wish to suggest that if the report adds anything to our present knowledge, subsequent to the 16th, in the way of strength figures, actions, or reports of action by other forces it will be worth while, particularly if there are any new dispatches.

I shall be looking forward to seeing your remarks on the Land Based Aircraft section of the opus. I personally and I know that the Commodore also feels the same way, appreciate and value your comments and although we do not always agree with your ideas, they are most valuable. I had always hoped that this analysis would be most thorough on the Japanese side and now that we are finishing up the first volume I am sure that it treats objectively the whole subject and is as complete as the available information permits. In all modesty I think that all of us have done a good job, and the exchange of thoughts, despite the 500 miles distance, has been good.

During the Commodore's absence I am going to draw up an outline of the narrative beginning at 0719 on the 17th and will appreciate your translations based on that time table. The air action will be somewhat limited but 1YB - 2YB and the Main Body developments will be needed. Hence anything gleaned from hitherto untranslated surface documents will be welcome.

I am most hopeful that the arrangements regarding the continued employment of Mrs. Tanaka and yourself sketchily described over the phone this morning will be concluded to everyone's satisfaction.

0175

Providing of course that you and Mrs. Tanaka are willing to remain, it appears to be the only way out of the dilemma, particularly as Mrs. Rosenberg seems to be adamant on the "ceiling" ukase, and providing that ONI can and will produce the necessary yen.

Best regards to Mrs. Tanaka and yourself, and remember me to Roger.

Sincerely,


J.J. ROCHEFORT.

Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami,
Office of Naval Records and History,
Room 1534, MAIN NAVY,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.


July 11, 1952

Dear Mr. Kawakami:

Your note of 9 July, together with comments on the remaining portion of the MSS have just been delivered and I hasten to reply, in the hope that you will be able to give me your thoughts on the Command Set-up.

First, though, I want to tell you how glad I am that both you and Mrs. Tanaka will be on the job, as usual after next week. Since talking to the Commodore just prior to his enplaning I have heard nothing of arrangements to be concluded. From the tenor of your note I assume, and hope that the matter has been arranged, if not to your complete pecuniary satisfaction, at least enough to keep you there. One of the blessings of a democracy such as ours is that you never know where you stand --only one thing is sure, we are all at the mercy of the administration.


With reference to the Command Set-up--I believe it is necessary to show "General Staff" somewhere and accordingly have hit on the following.



Either the above or a variation such as you have already noted to the effect that "ADM. OIKAWA - Chief of Naval General Staff."

The point is, I consider that the term Gen. Staff should appear somewhere in the Chain of Command and as they were not between GHQ and CinC, maybe the best place is in the big box.

Likewise as this chart is supposed to be the "Theoretical" chain, we want to show Tenno at the top. What do you think of this?



0177

Your other point in re FOURTH Air Army is well taken and I will correct the chart accordingly. Incidentally the chart shows Gen. K. UMEZU, which I have corrected to Y. UMEZU. You did not comment on this. Was it an oversight or should it be K. UMEZU?

As for your other comments I will endeavor to smooth out the discrepancies and arrive at something which will be mutually satisfactory.

Again may I say how glad I am that the job situation has been worked out.

Hastily and hoping the weather will take a turn for the better down your way.

Sincerely,


J.J. ROCHEFORT.

Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami,
Office of Naval Records and History,
Room 1534, MAIN NAVY,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

0178

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

29 July 1952

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami

I am forwarding herewith four weather charts from the ZUIKAKU. I believe they will be helpful to the study and suggest that you do them on a - time available basis.

The Commodore is due back the latter part of the week, at which time we hope to be able to put the finishing touches on the first volume.

I certainly hope that the weather takes a turn for the better down in your neighborhood. It has been a pretty foul summer and I know you have been working under some difficulties.


With best regards to everybody, I am,

Sincerely,


S.J. ROCHEFORT,
Captain, U.S. Navy.

Encl: Four weather charts
ZUIKAKU.

P.S. In regard to CofS Combined Fleet dispatch 171201 contained in the HYUGA Report, paragraph 2 is a little confusing and I would appreciate it if you would take another look at the original document if available. The Mobile Force Main Body was actually, at all times, under the direct command of Toyoda by reason of the fact that Ozawa commanded both KDB and KDMB. Also I think the parentheses are perhaps incorrectly placed.



0179

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

31 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Clarke H. KAWAKAMI

Commander MARINKE has been working on the Surigao Battle and in the preliminary phases of his study, involving construction of a consolidated track chart, he has raised the following questions:

- (a) Is the SHIGURE document (WDC 161717 Part IV) the only SHIGURE document available?
- (b) Is "Phone Log" complete in every entry, or are there other entries or more complete entries?
- (c) Could the bearings given be labeled "true" or "relative"? In some instances a bearing reciprocal to that furnished seems to fit the picture better when considered with the reports of the Allied units.

I would appreciate your looking over the original document again, or if you prefer, send the document up here and I will go over the entries with Commander MARINKE.

Regards,


J.J. ROCHEFORT

Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami,
Office of Naval Records & History,
Room 1534, MAIN NAVY,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

0180

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

July 31, 1952

Dear Mr. Kawakami:

I received your translations of ZUIKAKU and CHITOSE and in connection with them I do not think it is necessary to translate any more of the weather maps of KDMB in view of the fact that you are now translating one set of the ZUIKAKU.

I want to apologize for not sending down the MUSASHI-NAGATO reports as I completely forgot your previous request. I am sending them down now together with some rough translations of NAGATO and YAMATO which I have been doing in my spare moments. As you will see, they are not complete, but at least will save you the nuisance of translating the daily log. We would also like to have, in addition to the complete NAGATO and YAMATO Reports, the MUSASHI, including the very excellent damage chart. We would also like to have, eventually, the charts appended to both the NAGATO and YAMATO Reports. If you prefer to save yourself a lot of tracing work you can send them up and we'll have them traced here. In any event, there is no rush about them as they apply to the 24th and 25th.

As for the order of translating, I believe your present procedure is best, that is (a) message logs between 17th-22nd; (b) 1YB and 2YB; and then (c) any other Main Body Reports which you may run across. Sandwiched in between, any air information would be helpful.

The Commodore is trying to get the first volume finished as soon as possible, probably during August at which time we will then go ahead with the daily write-up beginning with the 17th. So you can see that for the present at least anything between the 17th and about the 22nd would be very welcome.

I sympathize with the difficulties in regard to the weather. It has been perfectly foul and even up here it is not too good. Like everything else though, it will pass and we will be complaining about the snow shortly.

0181

I noted in the past that the activities of your confrere with the French name, frequently comes under the heading of boondoggling. Incidentally, the same may apply to other organizations.

With best regards to Mrs. T and yourself and hopes that the weather takes a turn for the better, I am,

Sincerely,


J.J. ROCHEFORT

Enclosures:

- (1) CHITOSE DetAcRep Weather Charts (Japanese Document).
- (2) NAGATO Action Report 24-26 Oct 1944 (Rough Translations by JJR).
- (3) YAMATO Action Report 17-28 Oct 1944 (Rough Translations by JJR).
- (4) NAGATO, YAMATO, MUSASHI Action Reports (Japanese Document).
- (5) ZUIKAKU Detailed Action Report, SHO No. 1 Operation, 20-25 Oct 1944 (Typed from translations by CHK) - 3 copies. (Rough included)

Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami,
Office of Naval Records and History,
Room 1534, MAIN Navy,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

0182

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

4 August 1952

MEMORANDUM: Mr. Kawakami

Thanks very much for checking CinC Combined Fleet's 171201. It clears the matter up nicely and all is clear again.

In connection with the Command Relations Chart, we are desirous of adding a few more names to the Force Commanders as of 10-17 October. Can you help in the following:

- (a) Was TOTSUKA (Northeast Area Force) also Comdr Second Base Air Force? If not, who was?
- (b) Was MIKAWA (SWArea) also Comdr Philippine Force (3rd SoExFleet)? If not who?
- (c) Who was Comdr Third Base Air Force?
- and (d) Who were the Comdrs of 1st, 2nd and 4th SoExFleet?

Regards and hoping that the tooth is OK by now,

Sincerely,

J.J. ROCHEFORT.

Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami,
Office of Naval Records & History,
Room 1534, MAIN NAVY,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

Vice Adm. TAYUI, MINORU - 9/20/43

0183

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

August 8, 1952

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami

Thanks for the comments on the SHIGURE Report. I was sure, in view of the fact that you had first-hand information on the translation, that the remarks contained in the translation meant what they said. Commander MARINKE now will be ~~very~~ happy

As for the copy of "Imperial Japanese Navy in WWII" which I high-pressured you out of some time back, I want to apologize for the inconvenience my action caused. I called up that character in the Pentagon as you suggested and after conferring with another person, he assured me that another copy would be sent to PINEAU forthwith. I took his word for it, which turns out not to have been sound, and I forgot to check further. In any event, I am enclosing a receipt for the copy we have.

Also will send back the SHIGURE Report as soon as MARINKE returns from leave and assures me he has no further questions.

Best regards,


J.J. ROCHEFORT.

Encl: Receipt IJN in WWII

Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami,
Office of Naval Records & History,
Room 1534, MAIN NAVY,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

0184

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

August 25, 1952

Dear Mr. Kawakami:

I was very glad to get your comments on YAMATO Detailed Action Report. I found them very helpful and like you, I find some of the terms rather confusing. Here are some thoughts for whatever they are worth.

Turn: In the Navy, course is changed by a Fleet by either a course pennant (corpen) in which the heading is changed, usually by a van unit, each other unit changing as it reaches the turning point; or by a Turn in which all units change course simultaneously. Therefore all turns must be "simultaneous." I usually (in Navy terms) translate turns in terms of 10°, and if the turn is to the left, the numeral precedes the word turn. For example, a 300 turn to the left becomes 3 Turn, a 45° turn to the right becomes Turn 4.5, etc. Sometimes the documents refer to: "Turned to xxx°," which I translate simply as "Turned to xxx°" instead of "Turn xxx°."

Speeds: I arrived at the notes on speeds by comparing the Signal logs and the "Outline of Progress" in the three reports of BatDiv 1. Normally, Navy speeds are 1/3, 2/3, Standard, Full, and Flank in that order. The Japanese apparently used the term "Battle Speed" in lieu of the above. The only weakness in their system, it seems, is that different units used different battle speeds, so that say the BB's battle speed 1 was 16 (with a maximum speed of 25), if Battle Speed 1 for DD's was 16 its maximum speed was more on the order of 30 or more. "Flank Speed" means "all you have" and is a higher speed than "Full," therefore I put KYOSOKU at the top. Flank Speed would be a more descriptive term than "forced cruising speed." I missed the CarDiv 4 reference and would incline to the opinion that it was an error. Of course flank speed depends on the boilers in use, i.e. if only 2 boilers were cut in, "flank speed" would be less than if 4 were cut in.

Evasive Maneuvering: I have rendered all forms of evasive maneuvering by using the rudder as "maneuvering" or "evaded," etc. Perhaps in some instances it would be

helpful to know whether a torpedo or plane attack were evaded by port or starboard turns, but I doubt it. In practice the ship would "fish-tail" or use the rudder first one way, then the other, so that the direction of the rudder is placed first is not important. Also on turns or course changes - if, say, the course is 220 and it is being changed to 250, the rudder will in almost every case be put right so that the ship swings through 30°. If the rudder were put left the ship would swing through 330°. The same applies to turns, if the ship is heading 220 and a signal is made to turn to 250, the inclusion of "rudder put over to starboard" is unnecessary.

Zigzagging: I prefer, just the plain A or X method. Except when the zigzag is independently carried out, all ships will zigzag in unison, simultaneously, usually on time - that is, so many minutes on a certain course, then change course and so many minutes on a new course, etc.

You will note I usually simplify all conditions of readiness simply as

Set Condition 1 - (all hands at battle stations) -
Set Condition 2 - ($\frac{1}{2}$ of crew at battle stations)
etc.

As for your correcting my entries, I'll be very happy if you continue to do so. I'll defer to your judgment, that's what I think of my ability as a translator! Actually the main differences in the Yamato Report are more apparent than real. I lean to the Navy jargon while you lean toward literal meaning - both are accurate.

Best regards to Mrs. Tanaka and yourself.

Sincerely,


J.J. ROCHEFORT.

Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami,
Office of Naval Records and History,
Room 1534, MAIN Navy,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

*you are right in indicating all omissions,
Jan first lazy.
Hirai koto means to evade a torpedo attack
by course (rudder), speed changes or both and is
usually done independently, especially if the tracks
are sighted. The first Navy term would be
"Evaded" adding "by" if so desired*

0186

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

September 15, 1952

Dear Mr. Kawakami:

The period 17-21 is shaping up as well as can be expected. There are a few points on which additional information could be gainfully used.

- none*
- (1) Info on CinC's transfer of tankers to 1 YB about 17-18 October. That is, dispatches from CinC showing time and names of ships transferred.
- (2) The employment and composition of 931 AG, transferred to KDMB on 17 October.
- no data*
- (3) The disposition and strength of 8th Air Division on Formosa after the 16th, when and in what strength did they go to Philippines. *...ing?*
- (4) The significance of the reference to Camranh Bay mentioned in CruDiv 5 Communications Log (CruDiv 5 War Diary). Did 1 YB expect to proceed via Camranh? For fueling?
- (5) Any info bearing on KDB and 1 YB statements to the effect that they could not sortie on 19th. due to non-tankers at Brunei (1 YB) and loading of aircraft (KDB).
- (6) Any further information on fleet's reaction to Car-Nicobar diversion on 17th.
- Practically nothing*
- (7) And of course, the old story, i.e., air in the Philippines 17-21 October.

Regards,

Rocheport
J.J. ROCHEFORT

P.S. I need a copy of the interrogations of the Surigao, etc. survivors. Have gone thru ONI files - no luck. They transferred all of them to CIA who transferred them to NA with no inventory. Perhaps Pineau has a lead on them? I asked War Dept. some time ago but no luck.

JJR

0187

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

17 September 1952

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami.

During the time I had some of the documents up here I believe I saw in one of the reports a reference to the attack on Car-Nicobars on 17 October and using the term "diversion." If memory serves, the reference was at the bottom of the page under "Remarks," and occurred in one of the lesser command reports, such as a CruDiv or DesRon.

Now I cannot locate the item. If you run across the reference please let me have it so it can be included in our 17 October write-up.

Another subject - Several dispatches refer to originator as "Eastern Radio #1." I believe that should be Tokyo Radio, particularly if it is "TOTSU" or some similar abbreviation. An example would be GF DesOpOrd 333 as given in 708 Attack - Kanoya.

Best regards to Mrs. Tanaka and yourself, and say hello to Pineau.


J.J. ROCHEFORT.

Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami,
Office of Naval Records and History,
Room 1534, MAIN NAVY,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

0188

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

September 22, 1952

Dear Mr. Kawakami:

I am sending you herewith as an enclosure my last writeup on the Japanese Side of the operations for October 17th up to 0719 that date. I think you have seen some of this, but whether you have or not, I am sending it to make the continuity complete. I am particularly interested in your thoughts concerning the Japanese Plan which I hope you will find correct. I am enclosing with this the Allied Plan which will facilitate the consideration of the Japanese Plan. I am enclosing a General Summary which gives, as you can see, a sort of summation of both sides. Finally, I have introduced an Epilogue with which I plan to end this Volume. It is my hope that this Epilogue will alert the reader to the subsequent Volumes. If you find fault with this Epilogue or can disapprove or improve it, naturally I shall be glad to hear it.

I have no objection whatsoever to your going on leave as I think you are entitled to it. I know nothing of your contract so I don't know how your leave is handled. If you desire to take it, I would suggest that you handle it yourself in accordance with the terms of the contract which are, of course, unknown to me.

Should your leave be approved, I hope that you don't leave until you have finished reading these papers.

New subject: I note that you have, in some cases, been giving in full the situation (Introductory Remarks) as expressed in the beginning of the Action Reports of some ships and commanders. I also note that in other cases you drop it. Personally I consider that the situation is of great importance as it indicates to me what the commanders or commanding officers were thinking about. Often they disagree in their Situation Estimates. This also is valuable to me in appraising the whole situation. I should, therefore, prefer that the situation be translated in general, unless, of course, it is obviously worthless. Much of the information concerning Savo Island I got from the "situations" in the reports.

I shall be in Washington presently.

Please give my best regards to Mrs. Tanaka and with best regards to you, I am,

Sincerely yours,


R.W. BATES.

Encl:
Pages 633 to 664 (Orange side)
Appendix II (Volume I BFLG)
Allied Plan

Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami,
Office of Naval Records and History,
Room 1534, MAIN NAVY,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

9/25/57

Memo for Mr K.

Thank for the 1XB despatch of the 17th.
it is what I've been looking for. and my
face is a little red for overloading it before
in that connection. Could the "1500 tons"
listed as fueling requirement at Brunei
be a typographical error for "15800 tons"
or thereabouts?

Kurita says in his action report
that the fuel tank 15800 tons at Brunei.
and 1500 tons is obviously incorrect
as the Force would burn 500 to 1000 times
that amount enroute Lingga to Brunei.

Regards.
JBR.

Friday

Memo for Mr. K.

In re the 1XB message of 172103
which you found, your typed translation
gives time of arrival at Gumei as
"1000, 21 Oct."

Should not this read

"1000, 20 Oct"?

as they did actually arrive about noon of
the 20th, and at the time this message had
been sent, the entire time from Lingga
had already been fixed (0100, Oct 18)

Pardon the writing but we are using
the geomon on other work.

Regards to all

Rocky

0192

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

October 1st, 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami

If convenient I would appreciate you sending up the War Diary FIRST Escort Force 1-31 October (WDC 161719) which you mention in your "Japanese Fleet Dispositions", also the War Diary of the THIRD Escort Force for October, if available.

If you prefer, and have time to do so (that is if you are not going on leave), you can give me the information I want which is:

Location and movements of units of the Escort Force in the Empire-Singapore Area, in order to ascertain location of escort carriers, oilers and escorts during the period 17-24 October. Also data on complement of planes on Shinyo and Kaiyo and action taken locally to counter British action at Car-Nicobars.

Hope Mrs. T's indisposition is a thing of the past and you are enjoying this wonderful Fall weather.

Sincerely,


J.J. ROCHEFORT.

Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami,
Office of Naval Records & History,
Room 1534 MAIN NAVY,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

0193

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

October 23, 1952

Dear Mr. Kawakami:

May I thank you very much for putting the pressure on Roger Pineau so that I might get Koyanagi's statement. It has arrived and I am pleased to get it. I have re-read and I am satisfied that, whether intended or not, it is hindsight in a large part more than factual. This is not said in criticism because our American Admirals were just as forgetful. If you will remember Koyanagi talks about how useless it would be to destroy transports five days after the landing day since the transports would be empty. That makes good sense today, but it made no sense to Admirals Kurita and Koyanagi either at the time or on October 20th. At that time CinC, Combined Fleet directed Kurita to destroy enemy surface forces, after which he was to annihilate landing forces in a night attack. If the landing forces were out of the ships as Koyanagi states today, why and how could the striking force destroy the "landing force?"

In my mind Koyanagi is building up a story to cover the futility of their efforts and is listing many items which today look good, but which are not supported by the facts of the time. For that reason I have continued the write-up of the Japanese Plan as heretofore and have merely stated that the Japanese objective was "the destruction by decisive battle of the Allied support forces (such as the SEVENTH Fleet) which opposed its entry into the landing area" and then after annihilating these forces, the destruction of the transports at the beachhead. I am sorry if you do not concur in this view, since I appreciate your attitude very much.

I haven't heard a thing about your article on MacArthur's History and I hope I hear nothing unpleasant. You have nothing to worry about, however, if your facts are correct. Frankly, what General Willoughby has to say is unimportant to me since he wasn't too friendly to my agent, namely Roger Pineau.

0194

I hope that you have a pleasant leave when you take it and that all is well in the Washington section.

With very best regards to you and Mrs. Tanaka, I am,

Very sincerely yours,


R.W. BATES.

Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami,
Office of Naval Records & History,
Room 1534, MAIN NAVY,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

November 6, 1952

Dear Mr. Kawakami:

My intentions have been good in regard to answering your past notes, but procrastination was stronger. Now a specific matter has come up, so will get off a long delayed note.

As you know, a movie of the Battle of Savo Island is being made and in connection with that a message in Kanji is needed. The Commodore has asked that you prepare a dispatch, using naval dispatch phraseology, giving the following information. The message was received by the Japanese commander at 0725:

"Enemy task force of twenty ships attacking Tulagi-
undergoing severe bombing-landing preparations
underway-help is requested."

I believe Kaisho would be better than a form of Sosho, as it would perhaps look more authentic and would be easier to copy by the movie artists.

It will not be necessary to include the heading or the date-time group, just the body of message.

Your translations of the Escort Force, their air groups and the information on the Kaiyo, Shinyo, etc. have been most welcome and valuable. The picture is clearing up very nicely from my point of view.

Is there any possibility of getting a copy of Part III of "Naval Air Operations in the Philippines Area 1942-1945, Japanese Studies in World War II", Historical Section G2, GHQ, FEC file No. 8-5, JS-14? This is the document we call "Philippine Area Naval Operations."

I would have enjoyed seeing Lasswell and Taylor. Lasswell worked with me at Pearl during the war and is a good solid citizen. Taylor was not there, but I worked with him later. His "hatsuon" as I remember it, was pretty foul.

0196

-2-

I trust you have received the originals of the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Escort Force reports so Monsieur Pineau need worry no longer.

Read your piece in the Reporter with interest. To date have heard nothing up here regarding any possible repercussions.

This is about all. Best regards to both Mrs. T and yourself and trust you are enjoying the autumn.

Sincerely,


J.J. ROCHEFORT.

Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami,
Office of Naval Records & History,
Room 1534, MAIN NAVY,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

0197

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

November 19, 1952

Dear Mr. Kawakami:

Enclosed herewith is the page you recently sent up. I have had it photographed and I am sure the movie people will be satisfied.

For information, the time of receipt of 0725 was obtained from CRUDIV 6's report which stated the message was received at 0525 (minus 9). I am going to suggest that when the message is reproduced that the times be deleted.

Also, I am sending back the track chart which I previously extracted from the BATDIV 1 report. I thought you knew that I had it. In any event I have had it copied up here so will not need another copy.

With reference to the questions I asked you about the monograph--I had missed the point. What threw me was the change in name. Please forget the whole thing.

As you know from Commander Marinke, the Commodore is on the West Coast in connection with his mother's funeral and will probably not return until after Thanksgiving.

The typing of the First Volume is about finished and when the Commodore returns I expect we will start intensive work on the Second Volume commencing at 0719 October 17th. So if you have anything about that time would appreciate it.

With best regards to all.

Sincerely,


J.J. ROCHEFORT

Encl: Japanese Message
Track Chart BATDIV 1

Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami,
Office of Naval Records & History,
Room 1534 MAIN NAVY,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

0198

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

24 November 1952

Dear Mr. Kawakami:

I am returning herewith the original of the translation you did while I ferreted about for the POW interrogation last week.

Even though the Captain of the ASAGUMO seems to be off in his times and dates, his information is rather good, and I am glad to have it. The Captain of the MICHISIO had very little to say and he, unfortunately, is the one I am really interested in.

I wish to thank you and Roger Pineau for the assistance rendered me during my short visit. Please relay my appreciation to Pineau and tell him I had intended to see him on Thursday.

Sincerely yours,



C. A. MARINKE

Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami
Office of Naval Records and History
Room 1534, Main Navy
Navy Department
Washington 25, D. C.

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